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INTRODUCTION
That there are serious problems of civil service
performance in most of Africa is commonplace
knowledge.' What is less clear is how to correct them.
In my own research I have sought answers to this
question by looking at some of the many African public
servants who have been effective and done work of
high quality.2 By understanding what has made them
exceptional we can find clues as to what would make the
general picture brighter.
In this article I wish to offer a limited but ultimately
significant way of beginning to address the problem of
public sector failure. My research in Kenya suggests
that one of the several threads running through high
civil service performance is professionalism. I want to
suggest why this might be so and to indicate ways in
which one could build upon and extend professionalism
in Africa's public sector.
THE COLLECTIVE GOODS PROBLEM
The importance of professionalism to the public sector
has its roots in Africa's collective goods problem. The
economics literature has long made a distinction
between what it calls public and private goods. A pure
private good is one that is characterized by both
excludability and rivalness. Excludability means that it
is possible to prevent those who have not paid for the
good from consuming it. Rivalness indicates that one
individual's consumption of the good diminishes the
ability of others to consume it. Goods which possess
these attributes will be generated and allocated in an
economically optimal manner in a free, competitive
market. Pure public goods, such as a radio news
broadcast, are characterized by neither excludability
nor rivalness.3 Common-pool resources, such as an
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unpolluted, scenic sea beach, possess rivalness but not
excludability.4 These resources are particularly
vulnerable to the 'tragedy of the commons.' If a
common-owned field is not subject to sound collective
management, it can be destroyed by overgrazing as
each individual cattle owner tries to increase his share
of the benefits by grazing more and more livestock on
it. Pure public goods and common-pool resources
together can be designated as collective goods, ones
that lack excludability whether or not they possess
rivalness. According to rational choice theory, the
incentive to provide collective goods is always
problematic, for they are subject to what is known as
the free rider problem. Left to itself the market will not
generate an optimal amount of such goods, which is a
frequent justification for government action to provide
them. But this presumes that the state has the capacity
to manage its resources and services in the collective
interest.
Not only can the state create and manage collective
goods, it is one itself. It is a potential device for creating
and sustaining social benefits, but the potential will be
realized only if the state itself is managed in the
collective interest. Just as with the collectively owned
field, if those who control the state continuously use it
only to maximize their own narrow, individual
interests, they will soon run it down and it will produce
less and less benefit for society as a whole. Unrestrained
depredation on the state and its resources, sapping its
ability to produce and manage collective goods, is
precisely what has happened to many (although
certainly not all) African countries.5
This poor management of state-wide collective goods is
deeply rooted in the nature of African politics. African
peoples participate in politics primarily either as
individuals or as members of ethnic/regional/kinship
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groups. This form of participation evolves naturally
and powerfully into patron-client politics. The
overwhelming focus of African governmental activity,
as Robert Bates has shown, is on the production and
distribution of private goods, at the expense of
collective ones - unless the latter can be ethnically or
geographically defined. Consequently these societies
are seriously under-provided with collective goods,
including the public policies that add to collective
welfare. Thus we have the paradox that these states
may actually spend a substantial amount on, for
example, rural or agricultural services even while
agriculture or the quality of rural life is declining. The
expenditures are on relatively unproductive private
goods, while the desperately needed collective goods
are underfinanced or undermined.6
PROFESSIONALISM AND THE COLLECTIVE
GOODS PROBLEM
The professionalism of the senior civil service is a
partial solution to the African state's collective goods
problem. It certainly is not the only force acting on
African states to pursue broad, collective interests and
indeed probably only rarely is fully effective when it is
the only causative agent. My examination of African
public servants in Kenya who had a great and positive
effect on rural development points to the importance of
professionalism but suggests that other factors include:
nationalism, certain forms of class formation, and
international donor intervention.7 Nonetheless, I want
to concentrate here on professionalism.
Professionals are defined by three important attributes:
1 'The job . . . is technical - based on systematic
knowledge or doctrine acquired only through long
prescribed training.'
2 'The professional man (or woman) adheres to a set of
professional norms.'8 These involve 'a collectivity or
service orientation'9 and are what R. K. Merton calls
'institutionalized altruism.'°
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3 Professionals are oriented to their professional peers
for at least part of their approval and advancement.'
This last attribute implies some degree of autonomy for
the profession, enabling it at least to pass judgement on
the technical quality of the professional's work.'2
From these defining characteristics we can begin to see
the special kind of contribution professions have to
make to public sector performance in Africa (and
elsewhere). The normative structure of a profession
strongly tends toward the production of collective
goods, for at least it is dedicated to preventing a narrow
commitment to the private good of the practitioner or
even the client. The operative word in this sentence is
'tends.' Jam not making the claim that all professionals
adhere to professional norms. Freidson and others have
made it clear that this is not the case. Rather I am
suggesting only that the social system of the profession
operates in such a way (a) as to encourage these values
and (b) that those who show higher technical and
ethical standards are accorded the relative label of
being 'more professional' by their peers.'3
Some professions, such as economics and public
health, are inherently oriented to collective goods. And
veterinary medicine, as practiced in Africa, is primarily
directed to those ends. Others, such as curative
medicine and law, are focused on the private good of
individual patients. But at least the practitioner feels
some responsibility to the collective good aspects of
health or law (as a way of preventing the spread of
sickness or lawlessness) and is constrained against
acting purely out of selfish motives. Still other
professions have a commitment to standards that,
although perhaps not directed explicitly at protecting
client interests, do result in collective benefit.
Engineering standards of quality and efficiency tend to
to work to the collective good when employed in public
works.
2Wilensky, pp.151, 154. Freidson differs with Goode in holding that
autonomy is the true defining characteristic of a profession and that
knowledge and ethics are used only to support the claim to this status
with the public. Eliot Freidson, Profession of Medicine: A Study of the
Soc,ology of Applied Knowledge, Harper and Row, Nrw York, 1970:
79, 82. Whether they are a derived or defining characteristic,
however, a claim to ethical behaviour is a part of what we understand
tobe a profession. With respect to the degree of autonomy Freidson
further writes that 'control over work need not be total: what is
essential is control over the determination and evaluation of the
technical knowledge used in the work; important but secondary is
control of the social and economic terms of work. Thus, a
professional may remain a professional when he is socially
subordinate to someone who does not belong to his profesSion as long
as he is not technically subordinate . . . (T)he para-professional
occupation (is distinguished by) being technically subordinate to a
profession.' (pp.185-86.)
Even Freidson, who is uncertain that professions really are unqiue
with regard Co(a) acknowledges the existence of(b). Freidson, pp.81,
185-20 1.
Thus the professional has a propensity to translate into
collective goods the pressures and demands of
politicians and participating citizens, which otherwise
would produce private goods of sub-optimal benefit to
society. Without political and citizen pressure
administrators are likely to relax into service of their
own group interests; they do need to be energized by
others. But if they reshape the energy of interest group
demands so as to serve collective rather than private
ends, they are fulfilling their professional mission.
Professional norms also reduce the likelihood that the
professional will turn the situation to only his or her
own personal benefit, for example through corruption.
And professional standards press the practitioner to
provide service of a high technical quality.
Furthermore, when exercised by those with authority,
high professionalism has a positive effect on
organizational behaviour. Other professionals, even
though they themselves may not be behaving
professionally, accord respect only to those who
perform at the level of the profession's standards and
norms. As respect is a vital component in stimulating
staff to extra effort and to the solution of unanticipated
problems, organizations that are not headed by highly
professional individuals will deteriorate rapidly into
minimal and formalistic behaviour.
Finally, when professionalism is matched with the
existence of professional opportunities outside of the
country or government, it promotes risk-taking, for
those who lose career opportunities because of their
maintenance of professional standards or values can be
rewarded with alternative opportunities.
This list of the positive features of professionalism is
mitigated by a number of criticisms that the professions
have evoked both among progressives in industrialized
countries and among development specialists. The
major themes are:
that developing country professionals are too
wedded to élitist peer-oriented standards and methods,
leading them to 'state-of-the-art' practices that were
developed for the industrial world and are inappropriate
to the real needs of their (generally poor) clients;'4
that professionals, in being oriented toward their
peers, are not responsive to the expressed needs of their
clients and are not open to client participatory
structures; and
that many so-called professions have in fact become
nothing but self-enhancing status groups.'5
' Robert Chambers, Rural Development: Putting the Last First,
Longman, London, 1983.
"Ragia Abdin, Paul Bennell, Olufemi Fajana, Martin Godfrey and
Bachir Hamdouch, A World of D,fferentials, Hodder and Stoughton,
London, 1983.
76
There is a good deal of truth in these criticisms, but a
response can be made to them. First, the fact that
professionals do 'translate' client demands into
professionally congenial forms, which is unresponsive,
is actually part of their advantage in the conditions of
patron-client politics. It makes them more likely to
resist demands for purely private goods and to turn
them into collective ones. Everett Hughes once
suggested that, 'The quack is the man who continues
through time to please his customers but not his
colleagues."6 Note that this quote is not suggesting that
client responsiveness is bad, only that it must be
matched by faithfulness to collegial norms. Obviously
this is what critics such as Chambers really want, for
they are not enthusiastic about the way politicians
respond to citizen demand either.
Another part of the criticism is not so much of the
existence of professional norms and standards but of
their content. Chambers, for example, can be read as
not so much wanting to challenge professionalism as to
change some of its values, thus altering the types of
clients toward which it gives primacy, redefining its
methods, and seeing participation as part of its
professional methodology. It is instructive that
Chambers calls for a 'new professionalism."7
Finally, the deterioration of professions into corrupted
status groups is a problem and has to be addressed
through attention to the content and sustenance of
professional norms. The point is to compare the
dedicated professional not against some (perhaps
utopian) image of what a professional could be, but
against the career-oriented bureaucrat or political
patron who is the real alternative. There is a 'stage of
development' issue here. In the absence of social
groups that represent collective goods effectively in the
body politic, developing countries need all the
substitutes they can get, however imperfect their form.
In any case, what I am arguing for here is not the
promotion of professional status groups as ends in
themselves but as one of several devices for promoting
professional ideals in people's behaviour. On balance, I
think it is clear that Africa would be very well served by
the extension of professionalism, both in its public and
private sectors.
PROMOTING PROFESSIONALISM
How then is professionalism to be promoted in Africa?
Professionals are not produced and certainly are not
sustained simply through the exposure of individuals to
professional training. The mastery of technique and
"Everett C. Hughes, Men and Their Work, The Free Press of Glencoe,
New York, 1958. Cited in Wilensky, p.154.
Chambers, p.168. Emphasis added.
the socialization in professional norms that are
provided through this training are of critical
importance. But training and socialization alone will
not sustain the candidate professional in the face of
strong contrary pressures in the environment.
Only when the candidate professional has other
professionals as an important (if not the most
important) reference group in his or her work life will
he or she be transformed into a true professional. The
group of peers provides the social structure that
permits the professional to resist the otherwise
powerful pressures to fall short of professional norms.
The ideal model is that the professional association
would formally sanction or bar someone who violated
professional standards. Even short of formal sanctions,
however, the existence of informal criticism from a
group of people whom one respects and identifies with
is a powerful social sanction.
Inmost of Africa, however, the indigenous professional
community is too small and too weak to fulfill this peer
group function effectively alone. In this circumstance
the professional association is likely to be only a self-
enhancing status group, if it exists at all. Only those
individuals who are strongly oriented toward the
international profession and see their international
peers as a central reference group for their behaviour
are likely to behave appropriately. This was precisely
the explanation for the behaviour of two of the four
'African Successes' in Kenya I wrote about.'8
In order to strengthen African professions strong links
to international professional organizations are needed.
To begin with, this implies active participation in
international professional associations and gatherings
by a relatively substantial number of African
professionals - not the present tokens only.
Also implied is the involvement of the relevant
international professional organization in national
certification and in-service training functions until
such time as the counterpart national association is able
to cross a certain threshold in standards, size, and
autonomy. African professionals will be rightly
insulted at any implication that they are any less
dedicated to standards than their international
compatriots. But this is not the issue. The point instead
is that Africa's professional associations at the moment
are not closely connected to the academic centres that
are generating new professional knowledge. They also
are too small and fragile to be able to withstand the
substantial political and social pressures that are put on
them in their home countries, threatening their
8 Ishmael Muriithi and Harris Mule as described in Leonard,
Ch. 7-10, 12.
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integrity and autonomy. African professionals need
connections and support in order to meet the
professional standards to which they themselves
aspire. International links can help accomplish this.
An 'international grand corps' of African publIc
service professionals
I want to advance a rash proposal for giving strength
and autonomy to the professions in the public service in
Africa. It would need to be refined and advanced by
Africans themselves if international organizations were
to take it seriously. Thus I put it for.vard, not as a
finished proposal, but as the germ of an idea for African
professionals to develop if they feel it has merit.
At the moment professionalism in African civil services
is undermined by two major factors:
The siren call of international salaries for those who
are widely recognized as exceptional drains Africa of its
best talent - public servants who could do far greater
good at home than they are likely to achieve working
overseas, even in international development
organizations.
Those professionals who do remain in their home
countries generally suffer from a lack of autonomy, a
factor so important to the generation of professionalism
that it is generally used as part of its definition. Inmost
African states, for most of the professions, there are few
viable alternatives outside the public sector for those
who fall from political grace. This factor makes
professional public servants timid and conservative in
their behaviour. They become so anxious to avoid
offending their political masters that they actually
don't serve them very well.
My proposal for dealing with these problems is
inspired by the prestigious corporate bodies of
professionals in the French civil service known as the
'grand corps'. Each of these corps recruits its members
through an exceedingly competitive selection process
which assures it of being composed of 'the best and the
brightest.' Although each of these corps is responsible
for certain distinct state tasks, these are not necessarily
their most important functions. Instead they compete
with one another to provide cabinet ministers with staff
who can enjoy their confidence. These appointees serve
at the full discretion of the political leadership and
provide them with most of their policy advice and
administrative assistance. No matter where they serve,
however, members of the grands corps derive their
salaries from their corps and not their positions.
Individuals in a grand corps who enjoy the confidence
of the political leadership will serve in the most
important policy-making positions in the government;
those whose views are out of favour at the moment will
hold more routine posts in the civil service and
constitute a kind of administrative and policy 'staff in
waiting,' who will be available when the political winds
change. Those who enjoy the political confidence of the
moment enjoy the same tenure in their corps as those
who do not. They receive similar salaries. This material
security encourages members of the grand corps to
maintain high professional standards, be innovative
and take risks, which serves well both society and the
government of the day. However the fact that these
elite administrators only hold positions that are critical
to public policy when they have the confidence of the
political leadership assures political responsiveness.'9
African governments would be well served if they were
to have available to them a similar group of highly
talented and professional higher civil servants who
were politically responsive and adaptive to policy
change.
Specifically, then, I propose that for each profession
one creates an Africa-wide 'grand corps' with the
following attributes
1 People would be nominated for candidate member-
ship who had the appropriate minimum qualifications
for their profession, who had 5 to 10 years of public
sector work experience, and who were judged to have
been outstanding in their performance of those duties
- both as to technical quality and as to the 'publicness'
of values served.
2 Those elected to become candidate members would
attend a professional upgrading course of, say, two
months duration with all of the other candidates of that
year. The course would contribute to professional
competence but would also build peer ties. Upon
successful completion of the course, which would not
be guaranteed but which would be usual, the candidate
would become a junior member of the corps.
3 Junior members would receive a substantial
supplement to their incomes as long as they were in the
service of an African government or (possibly) an
indigenous non-governmental organization. They also
would be guaranteed a post in an international
organization (UN, IBRD, WHO, etc.) if their careers
became blocked despite their having performed their
duties at a high level of professional competence. The
former provision would encourage them to continue
working in poorly paid positions without turning to
corruption or private business for supplementary
sources of income. The latter provision would
encourage both risk-taking and adherence to pro-
fessional standards and ethics, for being faithful to
them would give them security. Thus it would promote
professional autonomy within the structure of the civil
services.
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4 An annual membership conference of the corps
would be held for, say, three days and the corps would
pay the costs of members in attending.
5 After not less than 15 years total of public service and
at least 5 years in the corps, junior members could be
nominated for senior membership. Senior members
would receive a still higher stipend under the same
condition as junior members. They also would elect
candidate members, junior members and senior
members.
6 The total number of people in any one corps would
eventually be about 500, so that its membership was
always quite select and élite.
7 These grand corps would be fully autonomous,
African-controlled bodies. The initial group of senior
members would be comprised of a dozen Africans who
were selected for their exceptional professionalism by a
relevant international professional organization. They
would select the other members and establish the
governance structure of the corps.
8 Each corps would be internationally financed,
perhaps by a consortium or the World Bank. The
justification for this finance would be that keeping
these professionals in their own countries would have
both direct effects on developmental performance and
spread effects on other civil servants that would have a
higher rate of return than most donor projects.
9 It is expected that at any given moment some of these
grand corps professionals would be out of favour with
their political leaders and therefore might be serving
internationally. The corps scheme, however, would
produce higher standards of service among those
professionals who remained and would facilitate the
return to national service of professionals if and when
they returned to political favour.
10 The purpose is not to impose international
professional policies on national political leaders. It is
presumed and would be encouraged that within the
bounds of professionalism there would be substantial
differences in the policy views of those elected to
membership in a corps. Instead the intention is to
provide a national political leader with the ability to
choose among a range of dedicated professionals,
leading to the selection of ones who simultaneously
inspire political confidence, have high competence, and
have sufficient autonomy to be able to channel the
energy and direction of political will into professional
forms that will more likely serve the collective interests
of the country.
POCKETS OF EXCELLENCE
There is no presumption in these proposals that
professionalism alone can rescue Africa from the
° Ezra N. Suleiman, Politics, Power and Bureaucracy in France: The Ezra N. Suleiman, Elites in French Society: The Politics of Survival,
Administrative Elite, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1974. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1978.
serious problems of public policy and administration
into which it has fallen all too frequently. All I hope for
is the creation of 'pockets of excellence' within the civil
service that can provide good service within their own
domains, grow as conditions permit, and serve as an
example to the rest of the government of what is
possible. There is substantial evidence that national
civil services need not be uniformly good or bad. Even
states with quite dismal standards in most of their
20 Robert Daland, Exploring Brazilian Bureaucracy: Performance and
Pathology, University Press of America, Washington DC, 1981.
Wolfram Fischer and Peter Lundgreen, 'The recruitment and
training of administrative and technical personnel,' in Charles Tilly
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public services frequently have exceptional enclaves of
high performance. These 'pockets of productivity'
become the growth points for positive change when
political and social conditions were favourable.20
It is such 'pockets of professional excellence' that we
need to create and sustain in order to provide for the
future of African development.
(ed.), The Formation of National States in Western Europe, Princeton
University Press, Princeton, 1975: 527-43. Leonard White, The
Jacksonians: A Study in Administrative History: 1829-1861,
Macmillan, New York, 1954: 16, 349, 352-53, 357.
